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1 Introduction
Managing the traffic of incoming and outgoing consumers is an important part of running
an online store. As consumers are typically busy, it is not irrelevant in which order they
sample the stores and how long a time they tend to stay in. Since firms can affect the
related consumer turnover rates in many ways by the organization of their online store, it
is also natural to regard them as endogenous. In this paper we analyze the effects of such
firm induced search frictions in a new way that, as a rather special novelty, allows us put a
single model based number, among other things, on the size of persistent price dispersion in
markets for homogenous commodities and on the relative numbers of informed consumers
and uninformed consumers. This ratio is one of the main parameters in the literature
following the seminal articles by Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989).1
Stressing out the importance of website design as a part of the marketing mix, there
is ample evidence that consumers are very sensitive to the navigation experience. Indeed,
it is claimed (Walker, 2013) that a large fraction of shopping carts is abandoned without
checking out for reasons like ”website navigation too complicated”, ”website crashed”,
”process was taking too long”, or ”website timed out”.2 Moreover, as customers use
shopping carts for entertainment and as an organizational tool and quite often need several
touch points with the website before buying (Kukar-Kinney and Close, 2010), when they
are finally looking for something to buy, they generally have quite a clear idea about the
website design. This implies in turn that developing a reputation that its website is fast
and easy to navigate could give the firm a significant advantage.
In this paper we attempt to capture a flavor of this real online search experience in a
simple theoretical model in a way that relates our results to those in the previous literature
on (i) equilibrium price dispersion (e.g., Burdett and Judd (1983), Butters (1977), Baye
et al. (2006a), Baye et al. (2006b), and Morgan et al. (2004)) and (ii) endogenous search
frictions (e.g., Wilson (2010), Carlin and Manso (2011), Ellison and Wolitzky (2012),
Piccione and Spiegler (2012), and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013), to name some).
We develop a dynamic, deadline based search model, closely related to Varian (1980)
and Stahl (1989) and to the extension by Wilson (2010), where we specify in more detail
how consumers actually search within and across competing stores during a single search
spell. To endogenize the intensity of competition, we let each of our firms publicly commit
to a level of frictions within its store - say, figuratively, by putting some sand or oil in
the wheels in terms of how its website content unravels to browsing consumers. These
1Interestingly, while our model is aimed to shed new light on the origins of search frictions, our theory
based numbers do not seem to fare too badly in comparison to empirical work. For instance, Baye et al.
(2006b) find that in a well-established online market for consumer electronics the difference between the
highest price and the lowest price is on average 57 %. Our simple model would predict it should be 50 %.
2Other, often mentioned reasons were related either to prices, other costs such as handling and delivery,
or payment process (hardship, security), and not having buying intent.
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frictions then basically determine the expected time costs of search in each store.
As our key result, the deadline and frictions let us pin down uniquely the usually ex-
ogenous numbers of informed and uninformed consumers: we show that there exist two
mirror image equilibria where these numbers are exactly the same. The outcome is thereby,
arguably, precisely halfway between Diamond equilibrium (the monopoly case, only un-
informed consumers) and Bertrand equilibrium (the competitive case, only informed con-
sumers). One could say that the market endogenously settles in a ”compromise”.
Specifically, both equilibria feature a faster, prominent firm and a slower, non-prominent
firm. All consumers search in an efficient manner from the former to the latter. Each firm
has however its own, strategic incentive to generate positive frictions, which delay the
consumer search process and render the equilibria inefficient; altogether, in a Poisson set-
ting, the related surplus loss is 6 %. The prominent firm, the non-prominent firm, and
consumers divide the remaining surplus in proportions 2:1:1, respectively.3
Our finding thus suggest that, while competition in search frictions may not eliminate
them entirely, thanks to it, the negative welfare effects can still be quite restricted; surplus
sharing is, obviously, somewhat more strongly affected because consumers optimally start
from the more expensive, faster store. As the cherry on top, we find it also quite remarkable
that these intriguingly sharp predictions arise in a model where there are essentially no
parameters: our setup does have a (fixed or random) deadline for consumers but this is
only a normalization. The equilibrium set is invariant to deadline changes.4
There is a large empirically motivated literature to develop theory models to explain
persistent price dispersion for homogenous commodities. The seminal article by Varian
(1980) observes that a natural way to generate price variance is to assume that consumers
are heterogenously informed about market prices. In another classic work Stahl (1989)
demonstrates that it is actually possible to span continuously from Diamond equilibrium
to Bertrand equilibrium by varying the share of informed consumers to uninformed con-
sumers. This share determines the intensity of competition in the market. However,
despite the obvious interest, to our current reading, there has been no work to analyze
what exactly these shares should be from an equilibrium perspective.
To bridge the gap, we consider this model where two firms choose the frictions in their
stores (in public) and their prices (in private) and, then, consumers search without costs
for a unit of time, until their deadline. Frictions refer to rates of the Poisson process for
which a consumer discovers the price in a store. At each moment in time, a consumer
decides in which firm’s store to search; it is costless to switch.
3The surplus loss comes from the prominent firm’s problem and the surplus sharing and the half-and-
half division of consumers originates from the non-prominent firm’s problem.
4In a Poisson setting for example, the firms set in equilibrium (θ1, θ2) = (2.76, 1.03). Now if the deadline
is scaled from t = 1 up to t = 2, these rates just have to be halved to make them (θ1, θ2) = (2.76/2, 1.03/2).
Clear prominence order and the exact surplus loss come from the Poisson structure but, otherwise, it can
be dispensed with; we could let the firms set directly the numbers of informed and uninformed consumers.
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This makes our model well suited to analyze online search, where switching costs are
low. Our findings then resonate with the general idea that, although search technology
keeps improving, due to endogenous countervailing adjustments by firms, total search costs
may not converge to zero. The point has been made, for instance, in a symmetric model
by Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) and in an asymmetric one by Wilson (2010).5,6 Both start
with a setup as in Stahl (1989) but let the firms readjust a consumer’s time cost of search by
various actions coined with the term obfuscation. Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) show that
obfuscation can be beneficial to all firms even after the consumers have learned to expect
it. Since consumers’ search costs are convex in search time, any time delay in the first store
makes the second search more costly, with a locking effect. Wilson (2010) observes that
duopolies have generally a well-known non-obfuscating firm and a less-known obfuscating
firm. By making its price hard to find, the obfuscating firm induces it competitor to
specialize in a less elastic part of demand, which relaxes price competition. A resembling
mechanism is at work also here; in particular the equilibrium price distributions look
much alike. Our paper can thus quite reasonably be considered a modification of Wilson
(2010) to analyze the effects of obfuscation on the numbers of informed and uninformed
consumers. While these numbers seem like one of the most natural adjustment margins to
changes in the difficulty of acquiring information, Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) and Wilson
(2010) keep them fixed.
Both papers find a multiplicity of equilibria for cases when there is no obfuscation
cost. In our case we can avoid this and pin down instead an essentially unique equilibrium
pattern because the fact that consumers have limited time for search creates an implicit
obfuscation cost. Namely, the higher the frictions the firms set, the larger the number of
consumers who fail to find anything and are thus basically driven out of the market. This
externality arising from obfuscation has not been taken into account in related models,
which have mainly looked at the intensive margin (prices), mostly ignoring the extensive
margin (demand).7
Another obvious difference is related to modeling approach. To endogenize the numbers
of informed and uninformed consumers, we use a new kind of search model, based on
deadlines and gradual arrival of price information within stores, that abstracts from the
typical hold-up problem in sequential search models where search costs are paid up-front.
The advantage of our approach is that we need not assume fixed search costs or fixed
5Our findings can also be juxtaposed with those in papers about market prominence. We find that a
strict prominence order will arise. The first prominent store is faster and has, therefore, also higher prices
and profit. There is no literature consensus about this: in Armstrong et al. (2009) and Rhodes (2011) the
first store has a higher price whereas in Arbatskaya (2007) and Wilson (2010) it is the other way.
6Our model has also some connections with competitive search models a` la Peters (1991), Moen (1997),
and Burdett et al. (2001): While we analyze a market where the firms commit to frictions that indirectly
advertize the price, competitive search models explore a market where the firms commit to prices that
indirectly advertize the frictions. The frictions are modeled by a Poisson process in both cases.
7However, see Taylor (2015) who studies a case where obfuscation has positive welfare effects.
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switching costs: these arise endogenously from the interplay of frictions and deadlines. Our
model is thus more self-contained. It has also a more detailed account of how consumers
search in stores.8
This paper is organized in the following way: The model is given in Section 2 followed
by a consumer’s search problem and a firm’s pricing problem. Section 3 contains the main
part of analysis: a firm’s problem of choosing the frictions, separately for the prominent
firm and the non-prominent firm. We offer some closing remarks in Section 5. Most proofs
appear in Appendix.
2 Model
There is a unit mass of consumers B = [0, 1], each with a unit of time t ∈ [0, 1] to find a
certain product and better prices, and two firms i ∈ {1, 2} selling these products in their
online stores for typically different prices. The unit production cost is normalized to zero
and the consumer valuation to one. As a novelty, the firms have the full control over the
”frictions” in their store θi ∈ [0,∞]. The firms also choose their prices pi ∈ [0, 1] or, as
equilibria are in randomized pricing strategies, their price distributions F i ∈ ∆ [0, 1].
Search is a random gradual process, which takes place in one of the stores at a time.
A consumer’s search cost is zero for t < 1 (before the deadline d = 1) and infinite for t > 1
(after the deadline d = 1).9 For every point in time t ∈ (0, 1), the consumers can thus
decide afresh weather to search in store i = 1 or in store i = 2. In store i = 1, the price,
p1, can be found at Poisson rate θ1 whereas, in store i = 2, the price, p2, can be found at
Poisson rate θ2. The consumers can switch freely on the go and recall earlier prices.10,11
The precise timing is:
1. Firms commit to rates θ = (θ1, θ2) in public.
2. Firms fix the prices p = (p1, p2) to be found.
3. Consumers search dynamically from t = 0 to t = 1 and buy the product with the
best price in the end.
8Usually a store is treated as a black box; but see Petrikaite (2015) and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (2016).
9As explained in the related article by Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (2016) the deadline can either be fixed or random
(the consumer will lose her patience at some random time point, modeled by another Poisson process).
10This gives our model a slight flavor of a Poisson bandit problem (see Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006)
for a compact review) where each store represents an ”arm”. We operate however, exceptionally, without
discounting in finite continuous time. There is also no tradeoff between exploitation and exploration
because the arms have a known expected value and they break up after the firm’s price is found.
11Depending how one views the idea that consumers have a fixed or random deadline, a kind of rule
of thumb to ration their search time, our model could be considered either behavioral or rational. Due to
the flat search cost, it has also some common traits with both sequential and non-sequential search models
(Baye et al., 2006a). Yet, all our consumers search dynamically rationally until their deadline.
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Thus, we have a three stage extensive game with a dynamic program embedded in the
final stage. Or, equivalently for this case, a two stage game where, first, the firms publicly
commit to the frictions and, then, the firms choose their randomized pricing strategies
and the consumers select their sequential search strategies.12,13
2.1 Search
The game next is solved by backwards induction. Without loss of generality we assume
that θ1 ≥ θ2. Thereby, the expected price in the faster store is denoted by E(p|F 1), the
expected price at the slower store is denoted by E(p|F 2), and the expected minimum of
the two prices by E(p|Fmin). A consumer’s problem can then be captured by the following
Bellman equation, which gives the value of searching at time t for a consumer who has
not yet found a price:
Vt := maxi=1,2V
i
t = maxi=1,2
(
θidt
(
(1− e−θ−i(1−t))(1− E(p|Fmin))
+ e−θ
−i(1−t)(1− E(p|F i))
)
+ (1− θidt)Vt+dt
)
. (1)
Before a price is found, the consumer chooses store i over store −i at time t only if the
associated value V it is at least as large as the comparable value V
−i
t . These consumer values
capture the following ideas: If a consumer searches in firm i’s store during a small length of
time dt > 0, she finds its price pi with probability θidt. When that happens, the consumer
obviously switches immediately to find also the other firm’s price. If the first price is
observed at time t, the probability of discovering also the other price is thus 1− e−θ−i(1−t)
(in that case, the consumers the minimum of pi and p−i but, otherwise, she buys for the
only price she has found, pi). To simplify the following analysis we assume here next that,
if the stores initially look the same to the consumers, i.e., if V 1t = V
2
t for t = 0, half the
consumers start their search from each and, if no reason for switching arises thereafter,
i.e., if V 1t = V
2
t for t > 0, they continue with their first store. To characterize consumer
search behavior, it thus only remains to determine how many consumers start from each
firm and whether they have an incentive switch the store at an some intermediary time
12Observe that like in Wilson (2010) it is important for the firms to commit to the frictions (they
represent here a firm’s long-term investment in a particular search technology within its store). Namely,
if it was feasible to change the frictions after the first stage, the non-prominent firm would like to serve
immediately all the consumers who visit its store. If the consumers knew this, they would first visit the
non-prominent firm. For that particular case, there might hence not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies
for frictions.
13This game is not equivalent with a strategic game in which the firms choose a distribution of prices
∆ [0, 1] and a distribution of rates ∆ [0,∞] and the consumers choose a search plan. Indeed, the reason
why Bertrand equilibrium is eliminated is that we let the firms set the rates first and only then choose
the prices. Note however that, even in this modification with simultaneous moves, Bertrand equilibrium
(θ,p) = (∞,∞; 0, 0) would not be robust to a slight tremble in pi or θi: both would make p−i > 0 a
profitable deviation.
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point t ∈ (0, 1) before their first price discovery.
Conveniently, we find that the optimal consumer strategy is stationary:
Lemma 1 The consumers switch the firm only when a price is found.
(i) If θi
(
1− E(p|F i)) > θ−i (1− E(p|F−i)), the consumers start from firm i = 1, 2 and
search there until they find its price.
(ii) If θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1)) = θ2 (1− E(p|F 2)), the consumers could start from either firm
and search there until they find its price.
Thus, consumer strategy can be represented by the fraction of consumers, t1, who start
from firm i = 1. The rest of them, t2 = 1 − t1, start of course from firm i = 2. The two
of these are captured together by t =
(
t1, t2
)
.
Note that in contrast to the usual exogenous partition as in Varian (1980) and Stahl
(1989), the interplay of frictions θ and consumer strategy t now partitions the set of
consumers endogenously into four disjoint sets
B∅ +B1 +B2 +B1,2 = 1,
where consumers B∅ fail to find any price, consumers Bi (”captives” or ”uninformed con-
sumers”) find just one of the two prices, pi, and consumers B1,2 (”shoppers” or ”informed
consumers”) manage to find both.
The number of consumers observing no price is
B∅ = t1e−θ
1
+ t2e−θ
2
,
and the number of trades is hence equal to
1−B∅ = 1− t1e−θ
1 − t2e−θ2 .
The numbers of captives to each firm are
B1 = t
1θe−θ and B2 = t2θe−θ, for θ = θ1 = θ2, (2)
and
B1 = t
1
∫ 1
0
e−θ
2(1−τ)θ1e−θ
1τdτ = t1
θ1
θ2 − θ1
(
e−θ
1 − e−θ2),
=
θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 −B∅
)
, for θ1 6= θ2, (3)
and
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B2 = t
2
∫ 1
0
e−θ
1(1−τ)θ2e−θ
2τdτ = t2
θ2
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1),
=
θ2
θ1 − θ2
(
B∅ − e−θ
1)
, for θ2 6= θ1, (4)
where, in the integrands, e−θiτ is the probability that the consumer does not find store
i’s price during time interval t ∈ [0, τ ], θi is the probability that the consumer succeeds
to discover this price exactly at moment t = τ , and e−θ−i(1−τ) is the probability that the
consumer does not find store −i’s price during time interval t ∈ [τ, 1]. The shoppers are
just the residual
B1,2 = 1−B∅ −B1 −B2. (5)
These notions will be used repeatedly in the firm’s pricing problem. It is clear from
above that
∂B1,2
∂t1
= 0, ∂B∅
∂t1
< 0, ∂B1
∂t1
> 0 and ∂B2
∂t1
< 0. In consequence, if consumer search
becomes more efficient, the number of shoppers does not change but the number of trades
increases and the faster (slower) firm gains more (less) captives.
To maximize the number of trades, the consumers should thus search in the faster store
at least until they have found one price; otherwise, more fail to trade. That is, efficient
search requires that, if store i = 1 has strictly lower frictions than store i = 2, i.e., θ1 > θ2,
all the consumers must start from store i = 1, i.e., t1 = 1− t2 = 1.
2.2 Prices
Now, for any partition of consumers {B∅, B1, B2, B1,2}, the profit Πi to firm i has, as is
standard, a price-sensitive part (shoppers) and a price-insensitive part (captives):
Πi(pi) =
(
Bi +B1,2(1− F−i(pi))
)
pi.
The equilibrium price distribution can thus be calculated much like in Varian (1980)
and Stahl (1989) for symmetric cases and Wilson (2010) for asymmetric cases:
Lemma 2 Consider θ =
(
θi, θ−i
)
and t =
(
t1, t2
)
such that B1 ≥ B2, B1 > 0, and
B1,2 > 0. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium price distribution F =
(
F 1, F 2
)
where
F 1(p) =
B2 +B1,2
B1,2
− Π
2
B1,2
1
p
for all p ∈ [p, 1) ,
with an atom α := B1−B2B1+B1,2 ≤ p at the highest price p = 1, and
F 2(p) =
B1 +B1,2
B1,2
− Π
1
B1,2
1
p
, for all p ∈ [p, 1] .
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The lowest price is given by p = B1B1+B1,2 and the firms’ profits by
Π1 = B1 and Π
2 = pB2 + (1− p)B1 ≤ B1
Observe also that both Diamond equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium could arise in
our model for suitably chosen frictions θ: if B1,2 = 0 (no shoppers; this would arise under
θ = (0, 0), θ = (a, 0) and θ = (0, a) for any a > 0), the firms use a pure strategy pi = 1
and, if B1,2 > 0 but B1 = B2 = 0 (no captives; this would arise under θ = (∞,∞)), the
firms use a pure strategy pi = 0.
Generally, the store with more captives has higher prices and profit. It mixes between
using random discount prices p1 < 1, to compete for shoppers, and the monopoly price
p1 = 1, to tax its numerous captives. There could hence be an atom at one. The other store
who has fewer captives would instead never use the monopoly price and, thus, randomizes
only the size of the discount, p2 < 1.
In other words, the stores’ equilibrium pricing strategies are wired so as to let them
specialize in different groups of consumers. This aligns the firms’ payoffs and helps to
relax the price competition. The profit to the high-profit firm, Π1, equals the number
of captives it attracts, B1, whereas the profit to the low-profit firm, Π
2, is a weighted
average of its own captives, B2, and the other firm’s captives, B1. Note that the weights,
p = B1B1+B1,2 and 1− p =
B1,2
B1+B1,2
could be taken as a measure of how close the market is
to Bertrand equilibrium (arises with B1,2 > 0,B1 = B2 = 0) or to Diamond equilibrium
(arises with B1,2 = 0,B1 > 0, B2 ≥ 0). Specifically, if the consumers have high ”bargaining
power”, captured by a low p, the firms have more closely aligned preferences but, if the
firms have high ”bargaining power”, captured by a high p, they compete more fiercely
over their share of the cake. As it later turns out, the outcome that obtains can thus
be regarded as a compromise of some kind between the two firms and the consumers. In
particular, we find that in equilibrium p = 1/2, B1 = B1,2, and B2 = 0.
It is now straightforward to calculate the expected prices for later use:
E(p|F 1) =
∫ 1
p
pf1(p)dp+ α =
Π2
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)
+ α
≥E(p|F 2) =
∫ 1
p
pf2(p)dp =
Π1
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)
≥E(p|Fmin) =
∫ 1
p
p
(
f2(p)
(
1− F 1(p))+ f1(p) (1− F 2(p))) dp
=
B1Π
1 +B2Π
2
B21,2
ln
(
1
p
)
+
Π1Π2
B21,2
(
1− p
p
)
.
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3 Equilibria
3.1 Fixed point in search and prices
We move on to analyze equilibrium frictions. Based on the earlier analysis, we find im-
portantly that any pair of frictions induces a unique fixed point in search and prices:
Proposition 1 For any θ, there exists a unique fixed point in search and prices (t,F)
where F = F(θ, t) and t = t(θ,F). In particular,
1. if θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))) ≥ θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0)))), then t1 = 1 − t2 = 1,
B1 > B2 = 0 and E(p|F 1) > E(p|F 2), whereas
2. if θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))) < θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0)))), then t1 = 1 − t2 < 1,
B1 ≥ B2 > 0, where t is the unique solution to
θ2
θ1
=
1− E(p|F 1(θ, t))
1− E(p|F 2(θ, t)) = 1− α(θ, t).
Concerning Proposition 1 note that, by Equations (2), (3), (4) and (5), B1, B2 and
B1,2 are determined by θ and t uniquely whereas, by Lemma 2, F is dependent on θ
and t only through B1, B2, and B1,2. This feature enables us to construct a hypotheti-
cal price distribution F(θ, t) based on each pair (θ, t) by first calculating the associated
B1(θ, t), B2(θ, t), and B1,2(θ, t) and thereafter the induced F(B1, B2, B1,2). Proposition
1 has also two noteworthy corollaries:
Corollary 1 (Effects of frictions on search efficiency) The consumers search efficiently if
the firms are either exactly similar in terms of their frictions, θ1 = θ2, or distinctly differ-
ent for efficient search based prices, θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))) ≥ θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0)))).
Corollary 2 (Effects of frictions on market prominence) Lower frictions grant a firm
more prominent market position and thus higher prices and profit: if θi ≥ θ−i, then more
consumers start from the firm and Bi ≥ B−i implying Πi ≥ Π−i and E(p|F i) ≥ E(p|F−i).
To sum up, we have now both symmetric and asymmetric candidate equilibria: If the
firms are equally fast, half the consumers start from each firm and firms use symmetric
pricing strategies and make the same profit whereas, if firm i = 1 is faster than firm i = 2,
it wins a more prominent position in the market and has higher prices and profit.
We concentrate next on pure strategies in frictions, although it is clear that there also
exist equilibria where the firms mix in frictions.14 Pure strategies seem more natural,
however, because we consider a game in which frictions become common knowledge for
the following subgame where the firms set their prices and the consumers search.
14An extension to a larger market also involves randomized strategies; a memo available upon request.
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3.2 Frictions: analytical results
This part contains our main results. First, we rule out the existence of symmetric equilibria
in general and, further, the existence of asymmetric equilibria where the consumers are
indifferent to which firm they start from. This demonstrates particularly that Diamond
equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium cannot arise in this game. Our next result also
implies that we can later focus on cases in which there is a prominent firm and a non-
prominent firm – and where all consumers start their search from the first one.
Lemma 3 There exists no equilibrium (a) where the firms use pure strategies for fric-
tions, θ2 ≤ θ1 <∞, and (b) a positive fraction of consumers start from firm i = 1 and a
positive fraction of consumers start from firm i = 2, i.e., t1 = 1 − t2 < 1. Furthermore,
the consumers are never indifferent to which store they start from; their preference order
is always strict.
The non-existence of Diamond equilibrium and Bertrand equilibium can be observed
also more simply:
Remark 1 There exist no Bertrand equilibrium, where either of the two firms generates
no frictions and the market price equals zero.
Proof. Bertrand equilibrium requires that both firms choose zero frictions θ = (∞,∞).
Yet, both firms gain if one of them deviates to some finite rate θ because it raises their
profit up from zero to
BiB1,2
Bi+B1,2
=
(
1− e−θ) e−θ (to the deviator, who has t−i = 0 due to
its positive frictions θ−i < ∞) and Bi = 1 − e−θ (to the non-deviator, who gains ti = 1
thanks to its markedly lower frictions θi =∞). 
Remark 2 There exist no Diamond equilibrium, where at least one firm generates
infinite frictions and the market price equals one.
Proof. As the consumers always search, Diamond equilibrium requires that at least one
of the firms is practically out of the market due to its infinite frictions, θ =
(
θi, 0
)
,
(
0, θ−i
)
.
Its profit then equals zero because it serves nobody. However, for any lower level of
frictions, the firm’s profit is positive, Πi = Bi > 0 or Π
−i = pB−i +
(
1− p)Bi > 0. There
is hence a profitable deviation to higher θ′ > 0. 
By Lemma 3, we now know that any equilibrium where firms use pure strategies for
frictions must have a faster, prominent firm and a slower, non-prominent firm. This
asymmetry of frictions arises as a natural way to relax price competition because the
firms can then specialize in different consumer segments: the prominent firm especially to
its uninformed captive consumers with totally inelastic demand and the non-prominent
firm to the price sensitive informed consumers. The idea is essentially the same as in
Wilson (2010). Nevertheless, as the consumers trade off higher prices for stronger frictions,
by choosing sufficiently different levels of frictions the firms can here, additionally, also
10
guarantee that the consumers search in an efficient manner and that there is not much
waste. Therefore, a strict prominence order arises in an equilibrium. The strictness of
the prominence order means that all consumers strictly prefer to start from the faster
firm i = 1; they switch to the slower firm i = 2 only when they have found the price p1.
As a result, the non-prominent firm does not attract any captives B2 = 0. The profits
for the prominent firm and the non-prominent firm are hence given by Π1 = B1 and
Π2 = (1 − p)B1 = (1 − α)B1 = B1B1,2/(B1 + B1,2), respectively. We next describe both
firms’ best responses in terms of their frictions.
3.2.1 Prominent firm’s problem
The prominent firm maximizes the following expression:
max
θ1
B1(θ) = max
θ1
θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 −B∅(θ1)
)
The prominent firm’s profit is given by the number of uninformed consumers, who are
its captives. Since consumers switch the store once they find a price, the prominent firm
has a tradeoff between maximizing the number of consumers who find its own price (by
decreasing the frictions, increasing the inflow) and minimizing the number of consumers
who find the other firm’ price (by increasing the frictions, decreasing the outflow). It is
hence optimal for it to avoid extremes and generate intermediate frictions. Unfortunately,
this implies that the number of trades is suboptimal.
Proposition 2 There exists no efficient equilibria, where the prominent firm generates
no frictions.
The intuition for this is that, since the prominent firm cannot reap (bear) the full
positive (negative) externality that faster (slower) search has on the consumers, it has no
incentive to serve every consumer instantaneously. Therefore, any equilibrium is inefficient:
though consumer search behavior is efficient, frictions are too high.
To put it another way, while the consumers are free to switch the store at any point,
we know that in equilibrium they do so only after they have found a price. This entails
that the rates at which price information arrives play a role of an implicit endogenous
switching cost. If the frictions are weaker in the first store, there is more time to discover
the price in the second one. That intensifies price competition. Therefore, although one
store could serve the entire market if it chose to play down its frictions, it has no incentive
to do so because that would also eliminate the switching cost.
It is noteworthy that both firms have thus a strategic incentive to generate intermediate
frictions, which does not arise, say, from a built-it cost saving motive. We analyze the
welfare consequence of this more in the following numerical part, where describe equilibria.
For the Poisson case we find that the surplus loss amounts to 6%.
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3.2.2 Non-prominent firm’s problem
The non-prominent firm maximizes the following expression:
max
θ2
B1(θ)B1,2(θ)
B1(θ) +B1,2(θ)
= max
θ2
θ1
θ1−θ2
(
e−θ2 −B∅(θ1)
) (
1−B∅(θ1)− θ1θ1−θ2
(
e−θ2 −B∅(θ1)
))
1−B∅(θ1)
,
or, equivalently, the product of the other firm’s captives and shoppers
max
θ2
B1(θ)B1,2(θ) = max
θ2
θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2−B∅(θ1)
)(
1−B∅(θ1)−
θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 −B∅(θ1)
))
.
This formulation demonstrates clearly that in the neighborhood of the equilibrium,
the non-prominent firm has here an unprecedented incentive to equalize the numbers of
informed consumers and uninformed consumers. Its demand is coming only from shoppers
but due to their intensifying effect on competition it wins them over more frequently if
the prominent firm has more captives, which raises its prices.
The non-prominent firm has thus mixed incentives in choosing the frictions: if it
elevates θ2, the number of informed consumers does go up (its has more potential demand)
but then the number of uninformed consumers goes down (competition becomes stronger);
the opposite happens if it lowers θ2. This clear tradeoff makes it profitable for the firm to
avoid extremes and choose instead a intermediate level of θ2.
Proposition 3 There are equally many informed consumers and uninformed consumers
in an equilibrium.
More specifically said, the non-prominent firm has an incentive to make sure that
the outcome is exactly in between Diamond equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium, as
measured by the relative numbers of informed consumers B1B1+B1,2 = p and uninformed
consumers
B1,2
B1+B1,2
= 1 − p. This entails that any equilibrium must have p = α = 1/2.
This is then reflected also in the surplus sharing: 50 % - 25 % - 25 %. We discuss the idea
more in the subsequent numerical part.
3.3 Frictions: numerical results
In this part we present numerical results to illustrate our findings and to support our claim
that there are just two equilibria in this game. The firm’s reaction curves are presented by
Figure 1.15 They have a discontinuity at
(
θ1, θ2
) ≈ (2.33, 2.33) and they cross each other
at
(
θ1, θ2
)? ≈ (2.76, 1.03) when θ1 ≥ θ2 (the assumed case) and at (θ1, θ2)? ≈ (1.03, 2.76)
15Grey color near the 45-degree line marks areas where we have only approximate results (no knowledge
about the exact best response, only upper bounds on profit).
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when θ2 ≥ θ1 (the inverse case). This pins down our two equilibrium points and suggests
that there exists a unique cutoff level for frictions θ′ ≈ 2.33 such that: if the other firm if
faster than this cutoff, θ−i < θ′, firm i’s best response is to become the prominent firm,
i.e., BRi(θ
−i) > θ−i, and, if the other firm is slower than it, θ−i > θ′, firm i’s best response
is to become the non prominent firm, i.e., BRi(θ
−i) < θ−i.
Figure 1: Best response functions: zoom-out (left), zoom-in (right).
Claim 1 There exist two equilibria in pure strategies for frictions, with the same unique
form: θ? ≈ (1.03, 2.76) and θ? ≈ (2.76, 1.03).
Proof. It is easy to ascertain that the first-order conditions of the prominent firm’s
problem and the non-prominent firm’s problem (Conditions (9), (10) and (11) in Ap-
pendix) are fulfilled uniquely by (θ1, θ2) ≈ (2.76, 1.03) if we assume that θ1 ≥ θ2. Other-
wise, we rely on Figure 1 and what we have in Appendix. 
Observation 1 Both equilibria have the same unique form:
1. Frictions: there is a prominent firm who sets frictions θi = 2.76 and a non-prominent
firm who sets frictions θ−i = 1.03. Thereby, the expected wait time in the former is
about 36% of the total time and the expected wait time in the latter is about 97% of
the total time. Note that these times can be regarded as endogenous search costs or
switching costs.
2. Search: The consumers search in the prominent firm until they find their first price
quote, ti = 1 and t−i = 0. Thus, 47 per cent of the consumers find both prices,
B1,2 ≈ 0.47, and 47 per cent of the consumers find a price from the prominent firm
but not from the non-prominent firm, Bi ≈ 0.47; 6 per cent of the consumers fail to
find a price, B∅ ≈ 0.06.
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3. Prices: The prominent firm offers the monopoly price (p = 1) and a random discount
price (p < 1) equally often, α = 0.5; the non-prominent firm always offers a random
discount price. Given that a firm offers a discount, the expected discount size is 31
per cent of the monopoly price at either firm; the largest such regularly used discount
is 50 per cent, p = 0.5.
4. Surplus sharing: The prominent firm is making the double of what the non-prominent
firm is making, Πi = Bi ≈ 0.47,Π−i = αB1,2 ≈ 0.5 · 0.47. The prominent firm also
gets half the surplus, the non-prominent firm gets a quarter and the consumers get
a quarter; 6 per cent of the cake is wasted.
Proof. An elementary calculation that uses the fact that θ ≈ (2.76, 1.03) and the
expressions that we have provided above for Bi(θ), B1,2(θ), B∅(θ), and E(p|F). 
This friction pattern is the unique one even if we extend or shorten the deadline. In
other words, the outcome is just the same (except for a possible renaming of firms) in
terms of search, prices, and profit whether the consumers can search for a decade or a
minute. In particular, for all choices of deadline, the firms have an incentive to adjust the
frictions such that the numbers of informed consumers and uninformed consumers are the
same.
Remark 3 An identical equilibrium outcome arises whatever the deadline d <∞ is as
long as it is finite: if (θi, θ−i) is an equilibrium when the search horizon is t ∈ [0, 1], then
( θ
i
d ,
θ−i
d ) is an equilibrium when the search horizon is t ∈ [0, d].
Observe, however, Bertrand equilibrium would be the unique equilibrium that if there
were no deadline and Diamond equilibrium would be another equilibrium if there was no
time at all.
Remark 4 There is a discontinuity in the equilibrium set as d→∞ because, at d =∞,
Bertrand equilibrium with pi ≡ 0 is the unique equilibrium.
Remark 5 There is a discontinuity in the equilibrium set as d→ 0 because, at d = 0,
Diamond equilibrium with pi ≡ 1 is another equilibrium.
To summarize, the set of equilibria is invariant to finite translations in the deadline,
which is the only exogenous parameter in our model. Bertrand equilibrium is possible only
if the consumers are extremely patient and Diamond equilibrium only if the consumers
are extremely impatient. Otherwise, the outcome is precisely in between these extremes
in the sense that there are exactly as many informed consumers as there are uninformed
consumers.
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4 Closing remarks
We introduce a new price search model that features endogenous frictions, modeled by the
gradual arrival of price information within stores and deadlines. Assuming that frictions
represent a firm’s long-term investment in a particular search technology, we find that
there exists a unique inefficient equilibrium pattern. There is a prominent firm, a non-
prominent firm, and, as our key finding, exactly equally many informed and uninformed
consumers in the market. In the Poisson setting, which we study for concreteness, welfare
loss amounts to approximately 6 per cent of the cake.
We observe that an identical result arises as long as there is a deadline by which a
consumer must stop. It could be two seconds or two decades; that does not matter. It is
because of this deadline that both firms have a strategic incentive to slow down searching
consumers slightly – but not in extreme amounts: If they keep frictions very high, the
consumers fail to find anything but, if the frictions are very low, the consumers become
perfectly informed, which drives the firms into a price war. Interestingly, as the deadline
approaches infinity, this Bertrand equilibrium reappears.
Appendix
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Step 1: Optimal search
For a starter, note that a consumer can find either zero prices, only firm i = 1’s price, only
firm i = 2’s price, or both prices. In the first case her payoff of course equals zero but in three
latter cases her payoffs can be denoted more shortly as follows
CS1 := 1− E(p|F 1), CS2 := 1− E(p|F 2), and CSmin := 1− E(p|Fmin).
It is clear that the probability of finding zero prices in minimized and the probability of finding
two prices maximized by searching in the faster store until a price is found. If the faster store is
also the cheaper one, it is also clearly optimal to start from there.
Now the only unresolved case is thus the one where the faster store has higher prices, i.e.,
where θ1 > θ2 and CS1 > CS2. This is also the relevant case here because, as we prove later, in
equilibrium this kind of tradeoff between frictions and prices arises.
Note that, as the consumers can switch freely any moment t, their continuation value Vt+dt in
equation (1) is the same whether the consumer is currently at firm i = 1 or at firm i = 2. This
implies that, to maximize the consumer value, Vt, the consumer should search in the store who is
offering the largest marginal descent in consumer value, V˙t:
argmaxiV
i
t = argminiV˙
i
t .
Now provided the consumer stays in store i during the next short time interval [t, t+ dt], this
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time derivative of the consumer value can be written as follows:16
Vt+dt − V it
dt
= −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t−dt)(1− E(p|F i)− Vt+dt)
+ (1− e−θ−i(1−t−dt))(1− E(p|Fmin)− Vt+dt)
)
→
V˙ it = −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t)(E(p|Fmin)− E(p|F i)) + (1− E(p|Fmin)− Vt)
)
.
Obviously, the consumer value is positive, V it ≥ 0, and the change in consumer value is negative,
V˙ it ≤ 0, for any t and i. Otherwise, it would pay off to stay idle.
To sum up what we have, this entails that for any point in time t ∈ [0, 1] a consumer who has
not yet discovered a price chooses store i = 1 over store i = 2 iff
θ1e−θ
2(1−t)(CS1 − Vt) + θ1(1− e−θ2(1−t))(CSmin − Vt) ≥
θ2e−θ
1(1−t)(CS2 − Vt) + θ2(1− e−θ2(1−t))(CSmin − Vt), (6)
or, iff
θ1e−θ
2(1−t)(CS1 − CSmin) + θ1(CSmin − Vt) ≥
θ2e−θ
1(1−t)(CS2 − CSmin) + θ2(CSmin − Vt). (7)
Using these expressions, we proceed by showing that, if a consumer prefers one store over the
other at a given point in time, t′, this is her preference order also later, for any t > t′; the stores
are thus absorbing.
For the first case, suppose that a consumer prefers firm i = 1’s store over firm i = 2’s store at
time t. That would give us:
θ1e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt)
−θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)− θ2 (CSmin − Vt) ≥ 0
and
V˙t = −θ1e−θ2(1−t)
(
CS1 − CSmin
)− θ1 (CSmin − Vt) .
To see now whether the consumer’s preference for store i = 1 over store i = 2 becomes stronger
or weaker over time, we differentiate (7) with respect to time to obtain
16Observe that the time derivative is well defined as long as the consumer does not change the store at
t. Furthermore, even if the consumer does switch the store at t, as long as the consumer does not switch
stores infinitely often, we can still use these same expressions which then only refer to the right derivative
of consumer’s value. It is the right derivative that matters for search incentives.
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θ1θ2e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)− θ1V˙t
− θ1θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2V˙t
= θ1θ2e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)− θ1θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)
+
(
θ1 − θ2) (θ1e−θ2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt))
+ θ1θ2 (CSmin − Vt)− θ1θ2 (CSmin − Vt)
= θ1
(
θ1e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt))
− θ1
(
θ2e−θ
1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2 (CSmin − Vt)) ≥ 0.
For the other case, suppose that a consumer prefers firm i = 2’s store over firm i = 1’s store
at time t. That we have:
θ1e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt)
−θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)− θ2 (CSmin − Vt) ≤ 0
and
V˙t = −θ2e−θ1(1−t)
(
CS2 − CSmin
)− θ2 (CSmin − Vt) .
Again, to see whether the consumer’s preference for store i = 1 over store i = 2 becomes
stronger or weaker over time, we differentiate (7) with respect to time
θ1θ2e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)− θ1V˙t
− θ1θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2V˙t
= θ1θ2e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)− θ1θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)
+
(
θ1 − θ2) (θ2e−θ1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2 (CSmin − Vt))
+ θ1θ2 (CSmin − Vt)− θ1θ2 (CSmin − Vt)
= θ2
(
θ1e−θ
2(1−t) (CS1 − CSmin)+ θ1 (CSmin − Vt))
− θ2
(
θ2e−θ
1(1−t) (CS2 − CSmin)+ θ2 (CSmin − Vt)) ≤ 0.
Altogether, this implies that the consumers have no incentive to switch before they find a
price.17 In other words, they always prefer to search in the same firm’s store from the beginning
t = 0 up to the deadline t = 1 given that no price is found in the meantime. To identify which
store this is, note that, at the deadline t = 1, consumers prefer firm i = 1’s store over firm i = 2’s
store iff the following condition holds
θ1CS1 ≥ θ2CS2. 
Step 2: Value function
We can now also show how to derive the consumer value function Vt. Based on what we just
found in Step 1, it is without loss to assume that all consumers start from store i and switch to
17Note that the derivative V˙t is well defined in both cases since the consumer has no incentive to switch
the firm: by continuity of (1), there exist no kink in Vt unless the consumer changes the store.
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store −i only when they find a price. Note first that
V˙ it = −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t)(CS1 − CSmin) + CSmin − Vt
)
defines a linear first order differential equation
V˙ it − θiVt = −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t)(CS1 − CSmin) + CSmin.
)
.
A solution to the related homogenous equation is
Vt = ce
θit,
where c is a constant. To solve the non-homogenous equation, we can use the variation of the
constants method in which we let the constants c(t) be dependent on time such that
Vt = c(t)e
θit, V˙t = c(t)θ
ieθ
it + c′(t)eθ
it.
This implies that
V˙ it + θ
iVt = c
′(t)eθ
it = −θi
(
e−θ
−i(1−t)(CSi − CSmin) + CSmin
)
and
c(t) = −
∫
θie−θ
ite−θ
−i(1−t)(CSi − CSmin)dt−
∫
θie−θ
itCSmindt+ d,
=
θi
θi − θ−i e
−θite−θ
−i(1−t)(CSi − CSmin) + e−θitCSmin + d,
where d is a constant. The consumer value is thereby given as
Vt =
(
θi
θi − θ−i e
−θite−θ
−i(1−t)(CSi − CSmin) + e−θitCSmin + d
)
eθ
it,
where the constant d is determined by the terminal condition
V1 =
θi
θi − θ−i (CS
i − CSmin) + CSmin + deθi = 0
implying
deθ
i
= − θ
i
θi − θ−i (CS
i − CSmin)− CSmin.
The general solution to the terminal value problem is given by
Vt = V
i
t =
θi
θi − θ−i
(
e−θ
−i(1−t) − e−θi(1−t)
)
(CSi − CSmin) +
(
1− e−θi(1−t)
)
CSmin
= Bti
(
CSi − CSmin
)
+
(
1−Bt∅
)
CSmin = B
t
iCS
i +Bt1,2CSmin,
where
18
Bti =
θi
θi − θ−i
(
e−θ
−i(1−t) − e−θi(1−t)
)
, for θi 6= θ−i,
Bti = e
θi(1−t), for θi = θ−i,
Bt1,2 =
(
1− e−θi(1−t)
)
. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Step 1: General form of price distributions
Lemma 4 Assume Bi > 0, either for firm i = 1 or firm i = 2, and B1,2 > 0. Then, the
following hold true in any equilibrium:
1. The firms use randomized pricing strategies: F 1 and F 2.
2. Both F 1 and F 2 have the same interval support supp(F ) =
[
p, p¯
]
, where 0 < p < p¯ = 1.
3. Neither has an atom at p ∈ [p, 1): limx→p−F i(x) = F i(p) for all p < 1 and i = 1, 2.
4. If F 1 has an atom at p = 1, F 2 has not and, if F 2 has an atom at p = 1, F 1 has not.
We assume in this proof that B1,2 > 0 (there are shoppers) and B1 > 0 or B2 > 0 (there are
captives). We also take ε > 0 to represent some tiny (infinitesimal) number.
First, we analyze three cases to prove by contradiction that both firms mix in equilibrium.
In doing so, we make the assumption that one of the firms uses a pure strategy pi. Case 1:
pi < min supp(F−i). As the demand Bi + B1,2 > 0 is unchanged as long as pi stays below
min supp(F−i), there is a profitable deviation for firm i from price pi to price pi + ε. Case 2:
pi > max supp(F−i). As the demand B−i + B1,2 > 0 is unchanged as long as pi stays above
max supp(F−i), there is a profitable deviation for firm −i from a price p ∈ supp(F−i) to a price
p + ε. Case 3a: pi > 0 and pi ∈ supp(F−i). As the demand B−i + B1,2(1 − F i(p)) jumps up at
p = pi, there is a profitable deviation for firm −i from price p−i to price p−i − ε. Case 3b: pi = 0
and 0 ∈ supp(F−i). Note that there are some captive consumers but, as both of the firms use the
price zero, both of them are making zero profit. Thus, the firm who has captive consumers has a
profitable deviation up from zero to extract some profit from the captive consumers. Altogether,
Cases 1, 2, 3a and 3b demonstrate that (i) both stores use randomized pricing strategies and that
(ii) both stores’ profit and prices are bounded away from zero.
Next, we consider the supports supp(F i) and supp(F−i) of the firm’s randomized strategies
F i and F−i. Suppose that supp(F i) 6= supp(F−i). This implies that there is some open set
U 6= ∅ such that, with no loss of generality, U ⊂ supp(F i) and U ∩ supp(F−i) = ∅. But now,
as the demand is unchanged for all pi ∈ U there is a profitable deviation up from the lower
prices in U to the higher prices in U . This shows that the firm mix over the same set of prices
supp(F ) := supp(F i) = supp(F−i).
Last, we examine the support for possible gaps and jumps/atoms and delineate its boundaries.
Gaps: Suppose the support is not connected but has a gap
[
g, g
] ∪ supp(F ) = ∅ but for some[
g − ε, g] ∪ supp(F ) 6= ∅ and [g, g + ε] ∪ supp(F ) 6= ∅. Then, as the demand is unchanged for all
p ∈ [g, g], there is a profitable deviation from some price p ∈ [g − ε, g] to some price p ∈ [g, g + ε].
Atoms: Suppose the strategy F i is not continuous but has an atom αi > 0 at piα ∈ supp(F ).
Then, as the demand from shoppers,
(
1− F i(p))B1,2, is reduced by αi at piα, there is a profitable
deviation for firm −i from a price piα or some price piα + ε to some price piα − ε. This implies that
there can be an atom at the upper bound only and used by a single firm only; this makes sure the
other firm does not use pα or any p
i
α+ε, from which it would have a profitable deviation. Bounds:
(i) Consider the highest price p the firms use. Note that the firm who has that price is only selling
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to its captive consumers Bi > 0. Hence, there is a profitable deviation up in p unless it equals 1.
(ii) Consider the lowest price p the firms use. As both of the stores make some profit, there is a
profitable deviation up in price p unless it is bounded away from 0. 
Step 2: Closed form of price distributions
Based on above, we only need to determine the firms’ profits Πi, the lower bound p > 0 of the
support, whether we need an atom αi > 0 at the upper bound p¯ = 1 of the support for firm i = 1
or i = 2, and the cumulative distribution functions F 1 and F 2.
Note first that, if firm i uses a price p = 1 − , which lies just below the upper bound, it
sells to its captives with probability one and to the shoppers with probability α−i, which gives the
likelihood that firm −i has the price p = 1. Evaluated at the upper bound the firm’s profit is thus
given by Πi = Bi + α
−iB1,2, for i = 1, 2.
Instead, by setting the lowest price p, the firm can attract both its captives and the shop-
pers with probability one. Evaluated at the lower bound the firm’s profit hence becomes Πi =
(Bi +B1,2) p, for i = 1, 2. As the profit has to be the same over the whole support to sustain
randomized pricing strategies, equating
Πi = Bi + α
−iB1,2 = (Bi +B1,2) p
for i = 1 and i = 2 gives us the lower bound
p =
Bi + α
−iB1,2
Bi +B1,2
=
B−i + αiB1,2
B−i +B1,2
.
Assuming Bi ≥ B−i, this is solvable only if αi = Bi−B−iBi+B1,2 ≥ 0 implying α−i = 0. To simplify,
we hence refer to αi by the shorter notion α. The profits can thus be written as Πi = Bi and
Π−i = B−i + αB1,2 and the lower bound is p = BiBi+B1,2 .
The cumulative distribution functions F 1 and F 2 can now be obtained in closed-form by
observing that the profit has to be invariant everywhere in the support. In particular, if a firm
i = 1, 2 sets price p, its profit is expressed as follows
Πi =
(
Bi + (1− F−i(p))B1,2
)
p, for i = 1, 2,
which gives
F i(p) =
B−i +B1,2
B1,2
− Π
−i
B1,2
1
p
, for p ≤ 1,
as required.
Observe also that the profit Π−i ≤ Πi can be rewritten as a convex combination of firm i’s
captives and firm −i’s captives
Π−i = B−i + αB1,2 = B−i +
Bi −B−i
Bi +B1,2
B1,2
Π−i =
(
1− B1,2
Bi +B1,2
)
B−i +
B1,2
Bi +B1,2
Bi
Π−i = pB−i + (1− p)Bi,
Also, if we continue still with that last expression we get,
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Π−i = −p (Bi −B−i) +Bi
= − Bi
Bi +B1,2
(Bi −B−i) +Bi
=
(
1− Bi −B−i
Bi +B1,2
)
Bi
= (1− α) Πi.
This expression will be needed a bit later in the paper. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.
Note first that by Lemma 1, if
θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1) > θ2 (1− E(p|F 2)) .
then all consumers start from firm i = 1, i.e., t1 = 1− t2 = 1, whereas, if
θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1) < θ2 (1− E(p|F 2)) .
then all consumers start from firm i = 2, i.e., t1 = 1− t2 = 0. Otherwise, if
θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1) = θ2 (1− E(p|F 2)) .
then any t1 = 1− t2 ∈ [0, 1] and t2 ∈ [0, 1] such that t1 = 1− t2 would do.
As discussed in the main text, remember that we can always assign a unique joint price distribu-
tion F := (F 1, F 2) to any frictions inside stores, θ, and fractions of consumers starting from each
firm, t. Namely, together θ and t generate a unique partition of consumers {B∅, B1, B2, B1,2},
which then in turn gives us a unique joint price distribution F characterized by Lemma 2; the
marginals can be denoted by F i(θ, t) = F i(θ1, θ2, t1, t2). This notation will be helpful in describ-
ing the relationship between frictions θ, search t, and prices F.
Note first that, if θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))) ≥ θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0))))), then the pair
F(θ, (1, 0)) and t = (1, 0) is clearly a fixed point. In other words, the price ratio which would
arise if all consumers began from store i = 1, E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))/E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0))), is not too high
to discourage consumers from actually starting from that more expensive firm.
It is also clear that, if we started to increase the fraction t1, starting from the level t? where
the firms have equally many captives B1 = B2 for the given level of frictions and raising t
1
gradually up to one, by continuity of E(p|F 1(θ, t))/E(p|F 2(θ, t)) in t, we must span all the values
of E(p|F 1)/E(p|F 2) between one and E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))/E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0))).
Hence, if we concentrate on cases where
θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (1, 0)))) < θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, (1, 0)))))
and θ1 > θ2 for which we would have
θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (t?, 1− t?)))) > θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, (t?, 1− t?))))) ,
by continuity there necessarily exist a fixed point in search and prices, where t in between t = (1, 0)
and t = (t?, 1− t?) and the following equality holds
θ1
θ2
=
1− E(p|F 2(θ, t))
1− E(p|F 1(θ, t)) . (8)
To elaborate on this, if (8) is satisfied, all consumers are indifferent between starting from
either firm. Each of them can hence be assigned to any start store. If they are assigned according
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to t, the firms are willing to price in accordance with F(θ, t): we have a fixed point.
Observe also that in the symmetric case with θ1 = θ2 we have a symmetric fixed point
θ1
(
1− E(p|F 1(θ, (t?, 1− t?)))) = θ2 (1− E(p|F 2(θ, (t?, 1− t?))))) .
For uniqueness, we can rely on the monotonicity of E(p|F 1(θ, t))/E(p|F 2(θ, t)) in t:
1− E(p|F 2(θ, t))
1− E(p|F 1(θ, t)) =
1− Π2B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− α
1− Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
=
1− pB2+(1−p)B1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− α
1− Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
=
1 +
pB1−pB2
B1,2
ln
(
1
p
)
− B1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− α
1− Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
=
1 + α B1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− B1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
− α
1− Π1B1,2 ln
(
1
p
)
=1− α,
where
∂α
∂t1
=
∂
∂t1
B1 −B2
B1 +B1,2
> 0,
because ∂B1∂t1 > 0,
∂B2
∂t1 < 0 and
∂B1,2
∂t1 = 0; these partials are easy to sign based on 2, 3, 4 and 5. As
a result, as we increase t1, starting from the point t? where B1 = B2 holds, all the way up until
unity, E(p|F 1(θ, t))/E(p|F 2(θ, t)) decreases: the fixed point is unique. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.
We just proved that for t1 < 1,
θ2
θ1
= 1− α
θ2
θ1
=
B2 +B1,2
B1 +B1,2
θ2
θ1
=
1−B∅ −B1
1−B∅ −B2
θ2
θ1
=
1−B∅
(
1− θ1θ1−θ2
)
− θ1θ1−θ2 e−θ
2
1−B∅
(
1 + θ
2
θ1−θ2
)
+ θ
1
θ2−θ2 e
−θ1
θ2
θ1
=
θ1 − θ2 + θ2B∅ − θ1e−θ2
θ1 − θ2 + θ2e−θ1 − θ1B∅
.
We can hence solve for B∅ as
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B∅ = −1
2
θ2
θ1
(
1− e−θ1
)
− 1
2
θ1
θ2
(
1− e−θ2
)
+ 1.
From here on, it is useful to work with the reparametrization ρ = θ
2
θ1 , which gives
B∅ = −1
2
ρ
(
1− e−θ1
)
− 1
2
ρ−1
(
1− e−θ2
)
+ 1.
Now, since ∂θ
1
∂ρ = − θ
1
ρ and
∂θ2
∂ρ =
θ2
ρ ,
∂B∅
∂ρ
= −1
2
(
1− e−θ1
)
+
1
2
θ1e−θ
1
+
1
2
ρ−1
(
1− e−θ2
)
+
1
2
ρ−2θ2e−θ
2
or, returning to the original variables,
∂B∅
∂ρ
=
1
2
(
−
(
1− e−θ1 − θ1e−θ1
)
+
θ1
θ2
(
1− e−θ2 + θ1e−θ2
))
.
This is positive for all θ1 ≥ θ2 > 0 because
1− e−θ1 − θ1e−θ1
θ1
<
1− e−θ1
θ1
<
1− e−θ2
θ2
<
1− e−θ2 + θ1e−θ2
θ2
and the function 1−e
−x
x is decreasing in x.
We can now revert to ρ = θ
2
θ1 =
1−B∅−B1
1−B∅−B2 to solve it for B1 and B2 as a function of ρ
B1 = (1− ρ) (1−B∅) + ρB2,
B2 =
(
1− ρ−1) (1−B∅) + ρ−1B1.
Their partials with respect to ρ are given by
∂B1
∂ρ
= − (1−B∅ −B2)− (1− ρ) ∂B∅
∂ρ
+ ρ
∂B2
∂ρ
,
∂B2
∂ρ
= ρ−1 (1−B∅ −B1)−
(
1− ρ−1) ∂B∅
∂ρ
+ ρ−1
∂B1
∂ρ
.
As we can now take ρ = ρ(θ1, θ2) as a firm’s choice variable, the first order conditions are
∂Π1
∂ρ
= 0⇐⇒ ∂B1
∂ρ
= 0⇐⇒ ρ∂B2
∂ρ
= 1−B∅ −B2 + (1− ρ) ∂B∅
∂ρ
> 0
and
∂Π2
∂ρ
= 0⇐⇒ (1− α)Π
1
∂ρ
= 0⇐⇒ ∂ρB1
∂ρ
= 0⇐⇒ B1 + ρ∂B1
∂ρ
= 0.
Both or them cannot be satisfied for the same ρ because a firm’s profit is positive, Π1 = B1 > 0.
This implies that it cannot be optimal for both firms to use such rates θ1 and θ2 that t1 < 1.
Observe that while this shows that θ
2
θ1 = 1 − α and t1 < 1 never hold in equilibrium, it does
not yet show that θ
2
θ1 = 1 − α and t1 = 1 could not arise. There are kinks in the first derivatives
of Π1 and Π2 at the boundary values of frictions where θ
2
θ1 = 1− α and t1 = 1 both hold. To rule
them out we need to get a bit ahead of our calculations so far.
Namely, our later analysis shows that the existence of this kind of a corner solution requires
that the prominent firm has a weak incentive to decrease θ1, the non-prominent firm has a weak
incentive to increase θ2 and the boundary condition holds. Together these three conditions can be
stated as (see the proofs for Propositions 2 and 3 and Claim 1)
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Figure 2: Graphs of two functions appearing repeatedly in the proofs.
eδ − 1
δ
≥ ρ−1 (9)
eδ − 1
δ
≥ 1
2
eθ
1 − 1
θ1
(10)
eδ − 1
δ2
=
eθ
1 − 1
(θ1)2
(11)
where δ = θ1 − θ2 ≥ 0 and ρ = θ2/θ1 ≤ 1. Now, note that 10 and 11 cannot hold unless θ2 ≤ θ1/2
and ρ−1 ≥ 2. However, for that high values of ρ−1 ≥ 2, Condition (9) is satisfied only when δ > x′,
where x′ ≈ 1.6 marks the value that minimizes the function ex−1x2 . Condition (11) gives a one
for one correspondence between δ and θ1 and cannot be satisfied unless δ ≤ x′ and θ1 ≥ x′.18
This contradiction thus rules out the case in which θ
2
θ1 = 1 − α and t1 = 1 both hold. In words,
consumers are never indifferent to their start store in equilibrium. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.
We consider case by case firm i’s best response, θi, to firm −i’s frictions, θ−i.
Case 1: θ−i = 0.
If firm −i is out of the market, firm i acts like a monopolist and serves its consumers instan-
taneously: θi =∞.
Case 2: θ−i ∈ (0,∞).
First, if the firm chooses an extremely slow rate θi = 0 it serves nobody and extracts no
profits.19
18Expect for cases where θ1 = δ and θ2 = 0 which we deal with in the proof of Proposition 2.
19For θi = 0, B−i = 1− e−θ−i and B∅ = e−θ−i while Bi = B1,2 = 0.
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Second, if the firm chooses an extremely fast rate θi =∞ such that ti = 1, the firm’s profit is
given as20
Πi = e−θ
−i
.
Third, if the firm chooses a finite but sufficiently fast rate θi >> θ−i such that ti = 1, the
firm’s profit can be written as
Πi =
θi
θi − θ−i
(
1− e−(θi−θ−i)
)
e−θ
−i
.
It is now easy to show that
θi
θi − θ−i
(
1− e−(θi−θ−i)
)
> 1
as long as
∣∣θi − 1∣∣ > ∣∣θ−i − 1∣∣.
This implies that, by choosing a large enough finite θi, the firm is guaranteed to extract more
revenue than by choosing θi = 0 or θi =∞.
Case 3: θ−i =∞.
Note first that, if both firms have an infinite rate, θi = ∞, all consumers find all prices and
both firms’ profits go to zero.
Instead, if firm −i has an infinite rate and firm i has a finite rate, θ−i =∞ and θi <∞ such
that t−i = 1, firm i’s profit is21
Πi =
B−i −Bi
B−i +B1,2
B1,2 = e
−θi
(
1− e−θi
)
,
It is maximized by θi = ln(2) <∞.
It is thus clear from Cases 1, 2 and 3 that θi =∞ cannot arise in equilibrium. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.
For values outside of the boundary where θ
2
θ1 = 1− α, the first order condition is
∂B1
∂θ2
(1−B∅ −B1)− ∂B1
∂θ2
B1 = 0
where B1,2 = 1−B∅ −B1. The unique solution is thereby given by B1 = B1,2.
Note also that ∂B1∂θ2 ≤ 0 because
B1 = θ
1e−θ
1 eδ − 1
δ
and ∂∂δ
eδ−1
δ ≥ 0 and ∂∂θ2 δ = −1. 
PROOF OF CLAIM 1.
Here we delineate some properties of the best response functions to support our analysis. We
first state the prominent firm’s and the non-prominent firm’s problems. We use the following
reparametrizations: δ = θ1 − θ2 ≥ 0 and ρ = θ2/θ1 ≤ 1 (as in the proof of Lemma 3).
(A) The prominent seller maximizes its profit B1
20For θi =∞, Bi = e−θ−i and B1,2 = 1− e−θ−i while B−i = B∅ = 0.
21Here, B−i = e−θ
i
and B1,2 = 1− e−θi whereas Bi = B∅ = 0.
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max
θ1
θ1e−θ
1 eδ − 1
δ
such that the prominence order stays the same:
ρ ≤ 1− α(θ1, θ2).
(B) The non prominent seller maximizes its profit (1− α)B1
max
θ2
Π2
B1B1,2
B1 +B1,2
= max
θ2
Π2
B1B1,2
1−B∅
such that the prominence order stays the same:
ρ ≤ 1− α(θ1, θ2).
It is clear from the proof of Proposition 3 that there exists a unique solution to the non-
prominent firm’s problem. We next show that there exist a unique solution also to the prominent
firm’s problem.
Step 1: Proof that there exists a unique solution θ1(θ2) to the prominent firm’s problem
Start by considering a relaxed unconstrained problem
max
θ1≥θ2
Π1,
where the prominent firm’s profit is represented by
Π1(θ1, θ2) :=
θ1
θ1 − θ2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1
)
.
The first partial with respect to θ1 is
∂Π1(θ1, θ2)
∂θ1
=
θ1
θ1 − θ2 e
−θ1 − θ
2
(θ1 − θ2)2
(
e−θ
2 − e−θ1
)
.
Thus, an increase in θ1 increases Π1 iff
f(θ1, θ2) := −e
δ − 1
δ
+ ρ−1 ≥ 0.
Therefore, the existence and uniqueness of the solution to this relaxed problem basically come
from on the fact that the growth rate of e
δ−1
δ =
e(θ
1−θ2)−1
θ1−θ2 is exponential in θ
1 whereas the growth
of ρ−1 = θ
1
θ2 is linear in θ
1. Let us consider this in more detail.
We can now differentiate this function f we just defined with respect to θ1 to obtain
f ′(θ1, θ2) := −δe
δ − eδ + 1
δ2
+
1
θ2
< −eδ + e
δ − 1
δ
+ ρ−1.
This implies that, if f = − eδ−1δ + ρ−1 is negative, the change in f ′ = − e
δ−1
δ + ρ
−1 is negative
(strictly negative for δ > 0 and zero for δ = 0) because
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eδ → 2e
δ − 1
δ2
, as δ → 0,
eδ > 2
eδ − 1
δ2
, for δ > 0.
In consequence, e
δ−1
δ and ρ
−1 cannot cross more than once. The solution to the first order condition
for an interior optimum e
δ−1
δ = ρ
−1 is thereby unique.
Regarding existence, note that, if we start with θ1 just above θ2 and, thus, with ρ ≈ 1 and
δ ≈ 0,
lim
θ1→θ2+
f(θ1, θ2) = 0 and lim
θ1→θ2+
f ′(θ1, θ2) =
1
θ2
− 1
2
.
The existence of interior solution θ1 > θ2 to this relaxed problem thus hinges on the condition
that the other store has strong enough frictions, i.e., θ2 < 2. Otherwise, our firm would prefer to
raise its own frictions by setting θ1 ≤ θ2.
Returning back to the original problem, it is hence clear that, if the constraint θ1 ≥ θ2 11−α
binds,
eδ − 1
δ
> ρ−1
(without the constraint, the firm would choose a lower θ1) but, if the constraint θ1 ≥ θ2 11−α is
slack,
eδ − 1
δ
= ρ−1
(without the constraint, the firm would choose the same θ1). 
Step 2: Proof that the solution θ1(θ2) is decreasing if the constraint is slack
Differentiating totally the first order condition
eδ − 1
δ
=
θ1
θ1
gives
dθ1
dθ2
=
ξ(δ)− θ1(θ2)2
ξ(δ)− 1θ2
,
where
ξ(x) :=
ex
x
− e
x − 1
x2
≥ 0.
This is negative if ξ(δ) ∈
[
1
θ2 ,
θ1
(θ2)2
]
.
Part 1: We first prove that ξ(δ) ≥ 1θ2 , when e
δ−1
δ = ρ
−1 holds:
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eδ
δ
− e
δ − 1
δ2
≥ 1
θ2
eδ
δ
− ρ−1 1
δ
≥ 1
θ2
eδ − 2ρ−1 ≥ −1
which holds because,
eδ − 2ρ−1 = e
δ(δ − 2) + 2
δ
≥ 0 ≥ −1.
Part 2: We then prove that ξ(δ) ≤ θ1(θ2)2 , when e
δ−1
δ = ρ
−1 holds:
eδ
δ
− e
δ − 1
δ2
≤ θ
1
(θ2)2
eδ
δ
− 1
δ
ρ−1 ≤ 1
θ2
ρ−1
eδ ≤ ρ−2
which holds because,
eδ ≤
(
eδ − 1
δ
)2
.
Altogether, this implies that dθ
1
dθ2 ≤ 0 when e
δ−1
δ = ρ
−1 binds. 
Step 3: Proof that the solution θ2(θ1) is decreasing if the constraint is slack
When t1 = 1− t2 = 1, B1 = B1,2 is equivalent to
2
eδ − 1
δ
=
eθ
1 − 1
θ1
.
Differentiating it totally results in
dθ1
dθ2
=
2ξ(δ)− ξ(θ1)
2ξ(δ)
,
where
ξ(x) :=
ex
x
− e
x − 1
x2
≥ 0.
To see when this is negative, observe
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2ξ(δ)− ξ(θ1) ≤ 0
2
(
eδ
δ
− e
δ − 1
δ2
)
−
(
eθ
1
θ1
− e
θ1 − 1
(θ1)2
)
≤ 0
2
eδ − 1 + 1
δ
− 2e
δ − 1
δ2
− e
θ1 − 1 + 1
θ1
+
eθ
1 − 1
(θ1)2
≤ 0
2
1
δ
− 21
δ
eδ − 1
δ
− 1
θ1
+
1
θ1
eθ
1 − 1
θ1
≤ 0(
2
1
δ
− 1
θ1
)
−
(
1
δ
− 1
θ1
)
2
eδ − 1
δ
≤ 0
1
δ
+
(
1
δ
− 1
θ1
)(
1− 2e
δ − 1
δ
)
≤ 0
1 + ρ
(
1− 2e
δ − 1
δ
)
≤ 0.
We can now solve ρ from 2 e
δ−1
δ =
eθ
1−1
θ1 ,
ρ = 1− 2 e
δ − 1
eθ1 − 1 ,
and then continue with the calculation,
(
1− 2 e
δ − 1
eθ1 − 1
)(
1− 2e
δ − 1
δ
)
≤ −1
−2 e
δ − 1
eθ1 − 1 − 2
eδ − 1
δ
+ 4
(eδ − 1)2
δ(eθ1 − 1) ≤ −2
eθ
1 − 1
eθ1 − 1
− (e
δ − 1)δ
(eθ1 − 1)δ −
(eδ − 1)(eθ1 − 1)
(eθ1 − 1)δ + 2
(eδ − 1)2
(eθ1 − 1)δ +
(eθ
1 − 1)δ
(eθ1 − 1)δ ≤ 0
− (e
δ − 1)δ
δ
− (e
δ − 1)(eθ1 − 1)
δ
+ 2
(eδ − 1)2
δ
+
(eθ
1 − 1)δ
δ
≤ 0
−(eδ − 1)− (e
δ − 1)(eθ1 − 1)
δ
+
(eδ − 1)(eθ1 − 1)
θ1
+ (eθ
1 − 1) ≤ 0
(eθ
1 − 1)
(
eδ − 1
δ
− 1
)
≥ (eδ − 1)
(
eθ
1 − 1
θ1
− 1
)
(eθ
1 − 1)
eθ1−1
θ1 − 1
≥ (e
δ − 1)
eδ−1
δ − 1
.
This is true because θ1 ≥ δ and (ex−1)ex−1
x −1
is increasing in x. We have thus demonstrated that
dθ1
dθ2 ≤ 0 as long as 2 e
δ−1
δ =
eθ
1−1
θ1 binds. 
Step 4: Proof that the solutions θ1(θ2) and θ2(θ1) are monotone if the constraint binds:
When t1 = 1− t2 = 1, 1− α = ρ is equivalent to
eδ − 1
δ2
=
eθ
1 − 1
(θ1)2
.
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Since e
x−1
x2 is strictly decreasing for x < x
′ and strictly increasing for x > x′ where x′ ≈ 1.6 > 0,
this can be satisfied only if δ = θ1−θ2 < x′ and θ1 > x′. Moreover, if θ1 increases, then δ = θ1−θ2
decreases. Therefore, if 1− α = ρ binds, then dθ1dθ2 ≥ 0 holds. 
Step 5: Proof that any solution to both the prominent firm’s problem and the non-prominent firm’s
problem is unique
Any pair (θ1, θ2) that solves both the prominent firm’s problem and the non-prominent firm’s
problem satisfies the following first order conditions
eδ − 1
δ
= ρ−1, (12)
eδ − 1
δ
=
1
2
eθ
1 − 1
θ1
. (13)
It is also clear based on our previous analysis that, if we start from some given θ2, there can be
only one θ1 = θ′ that satisfies (12) for this θ2 and only one θ1 = θ′′ that satisfies (13) for that θ2.
Moreover, if we join the two conditions by equating the right hand sides, the resulting condition,
1
2
eθ
1 − 1
(θ1)2
=
1
θ2
, (14)
is satisfied by a unique θ1 for which it holds that θ1 > x′ ≈ 1.6; the last one is a condition that
should hold in an equilibrium according to Step 4. 
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